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INTRODUCTION
In July 2016, parents at Assumption Catholic School in a small
city in Washington learned that the school had failed to inform them
about the presence of a registered sex offender parent for nearly a
year.1 Although school officials established strict policies regarding
the supervision of the parent while on school grounds, they decided
against informing the families of all the students.2 In the 1980s, this
parent was convicted of molesting two girls under the age of twelve in
South Dakota.3 In 2002, he was convicted for abusing two other girls
in Washington.4 By 2008, he was charged again with molesting two

 J.D. candidate, December 2016, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; M.B.A., Leadership, Aurora University, 2011; B.S.,
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Science, College of DuPage, 2004. The author would like to thank her husband for
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1
Caleb Hutton, Bellingham Parents Withdraw Kids From Catholic School
Over Sex Offender Controversy, THE BELLINGHAM HERALD (Oct. 16, 2016),
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/news/local/article108369317.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
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more underage girls.5 This time, the charges were dropped due to a
lack of sufficient evidence.6 A few years later, he married a woman
who gave birth to his daughter.7 In 2015, their daughter started
attending preschool at Assumption.8 The following year, one of the
mothers at the elementary school started pairing up new families with
more established ones in order to create a “buddy system.”9 When a
family declined to be paired up with the sex offender’s family, the
mother decided to search for answers on the Internet.10 To her horror,
she found out that the man who had been visiting the school on a daily
basis was a registered sex offender.11 The school principal somehow
concluded that because the preschool was separate from the other
schools, the notification of parents outside of the preschool was
unnecessary, especially since the sex offender was only on campus for
a “very, very brief” time.12 Several parents found the presence of a
known sex offender and the “moderate risk” that he would reoffend
too much to bear and decided to withdraw their children from the
school.13
This worry is exactly what Wisconsin legislators sought to address
when they passed Section 301.48 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which
requires lifetime GPS monitoring of serious child sex offenders.14 The
relevant portion of the statute states:
(2) Who is covered . . .
(b) Except as provided in subs. (7) and (7m), the department
shall maintain lifetime tracking of a person if any of the
5

Id.
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
WIS. STAT. § 301.48 (2006).
6
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following occurs with respect to the person on or after
January 1, 2008 . . .
2. A court discharges the person under s. 980.09 (4). This
subdivision does not apply if the person was on supervised
release immediately before being discharged.15
The above provision of the statute applies to sexually violent
persons who were released from civil commitment.16 The language of
980.09(4) states:
If the court or jury is satisfied that the state has not met its
burden of proof under sub. (3), the person shall be discharged
from the custody of the department. If the court or jury is
satisfied that the state has met its burden of proof under sub.
(3), the court shall proceed under s. 980.08 (4) to determine
whether to modify the person’s existing commitment order by
authorizing supervised release, unless the person waives
consideration of the criteria in s. 980.08 (4) (cg). If the person
waives consideration of these criteria, the waiver is a denial
of supervised release for purposes of s. 980.08 (1).17
A recent case involving this statute, Belleau v. Wall, tells the story
of Michael Belleau who was convicted of multiple sexual assaults of
minors.18 After spending years in prison, in jail, and on probation, he
was committed to a secure treatment center as “a sexually violent
person” under Chapter 980 of the Wisconsin Statutes.19
“Sexually violent person” means a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found
15

§ 301.48(2)(b)(2).
Id.
17
WIS. STAT. § 980.09(4) (1994).
18
Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 2015).
19
Id.
16

137
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 6

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 12, Issue 1

Fall 2016

not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense
by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect, or illness, and
who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage in
one or more acts of sexual violence.20
In 2010, he was released from civil commitment wearing a GPS
tracking device on his right ankle.21 By then, Belleau’s sentences had
expired, and he was not under any form of supervision.22 If the
lifetime monitoring was part of his sentence as punishment for his
crimes, the story would have ended here.23 “Given the fact that one
can be sentenced to life in prison for such a crime, it necessarily
follows that lifetime GPS tracking, as a component of a sentence
imposed for such an offense, would be lawful.”24 Similarly, the
monitoring would have been acceptable if it was a condition of his
release.25 The United States District Court Eastern District of
Wisconsin declared that the statute was an ex post facto law because it
applied to Belleau retroactively and because it was punitive in effect.26
Judge Griesbach further held that the monitoring program was not a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.27
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
overturned the decision and declared that the statute did not violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because the monitoring was
considered “prevention,” not “punishment.”28 It also decided that the
statute did not offend the Fourth Amendment because a search under
the circumstances was reasonable, and the Amendment only prohibits
20

§ 980.01(7).
Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1090.
22
Id. at 1093.
23
Id. at 1092.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 1104.
27
Id. at 1109-10.
28
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016).
21
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unreasonable searches.29 After all, people like Belleau “have a
diminished right of privacy as a result of the risk of their
recidivating.”30
Despite having the best interests of children in mind, GPS
monitoring laws have the potential to infringe upon the constitutional
rights of offenders. Part I of this paper takes a closer look at the
background of lifetime satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders.
Part II focuses on the procedural history of Belleau v. Wall and reviews
the contrasting opinions of the district court and the Seventh Circuit.
Lastly, Part III discusses the current state and the constitutional
implications of lifetime tracking programs.
I.

SHOULD STATES MONITOR SEX OFFENDERS FOR LIFE?

The majority of victims do not report sexual abuse.31 This is
especially true when the victims are minors.32 Children often have
difficulty describing what happened to them.33 Though they may
provide hints, these are easily missed by adults.34 Other times, children
are simply too afraid to talk, either because they don’t know how their
parents will react or they worry that their abusers may retaliate.35 The
younger the victim, the more likely the crime goes unreported.36 In
light of these facts, it is not hard to imagine that many children grow
29

Id.
Id. at 935.
31
DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L SEX OFFENDER PUBLIC WEBSITE: RAISING
AWARENESS ABOUT SEXUAL ABUSE FACTS AND STATISTICS,
https://www.nsopw.gov/(X(1)S(asm1fvbvnzx3szfwiqa13rtf))/enUS/Education/FactsStatistics?Aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Roger Przybylski, Chapter 5: Adult Sex Offender Recidivism (Sex Offender
Management Assessment and Planning Initiative NCJ 247059, Oct. 2014),
http://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec1/ch5_recidivism.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2017).
30
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up without access to adequate treatment and that, in turn, increases the
likelihood of anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and even suicide.37
Even with treatment, the psychological and physical scars remain for
many years, if not forever.38 Victims are more likely to run into
problems in school and have difficulty holding onto jobs as adults.39
They may even become child abusers themselves.40
The high rate of recidivism further exacerbates the problem.41
Because of the significant underreporting of these crimes, it is
particularly difficult to properly estimate how high the recidivism rates
are among child sex offenders.42 Pedophiles with more than one prior
arrest are two or three times more likely to repeat their crimes.43 The
National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) sponsored a study that examined
the effect of satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders in California.44
The study “found that those placed on GPS monitoring had
significantly lower recidivism rates than those who received traditional
supervision.”45 In fact, 38% more arrests were recorded in the group
37

Understanding and Preventing Child Abuse and Neglect, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION,
http://www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/understanding-child-abuse.aspx (last
visited Nov. 11, 2016).
38
Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, DARKNESS TO LIGHT,
http://www.d2l.org/atf/cf/{64AF78C4-5EB8-45AA-BC28F7EE2B581919}/Statistics_5_Consequences.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
39
Child and Adolescent Psychiatrists, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY,
http://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/FFFGuide/Child-Abuse-The-Hidden-Bruises-005.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
40
Sexual Abuse, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY,
http://www.aacap.org/AACAP/Families_and_Youth/Facts_for_Families/FFFGuide/Child-Sexual-Abuse-009.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
41
Przybylski, supra note 36.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Philip Bulman, Sex Offenders Monitored by GPS Found to Commit Fewer
Crimes, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.nij.gov/journals/271/pages/gps-monitoring.aspx.
45
Id.
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under traditional supervision as opposed to the group wearing GPS
monitors.46
With these statistics in mind and given the states’ well-recognized
compelling interest in protecting children from physical and
psychological harm, it is understandable why many states have
enacted statutes requiring the satellite-based monitoring of sexual
predators.47 A few of the states even provide for lifetime monitoring.48
Nonetheless, legislatures should not overlook the constitutional
implications of these programs. The Seventh Circuit analyzed both the
Fourth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause to determine that the
Wisconsin statute was constitutional.
A. The Fourth Amendment
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution is to protect people from unreasonable searches and
seizures.49 As the word “unreasonable” suggests, not all searches are
prohibited.50 Determining what is reasonable is usually not simple and
may involve the balancing of the right of individuals “to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects” against legitimate
government interests.51
In Grady v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court reviewed the case
of Torrey Dale Grady, a two-time sex offender subjected to North

46

Id.
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989); Warren Richey, GPS monitoring of sex offenders for life? Supreme Court
reverses N.C. case, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (March 30, 2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0330/GPS-monitoring-of-sexoffenders-for-life-Supreme-Court-reverses-N.C.-case-video. (1989).
48
Richey, supra note 47.
49
What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, United States Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/abouteducational-outreach/activity-resources/what-does-0 (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
50
Id.
51
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47
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Carolina’s lifetime satellite-based monitoring program.52 Grady argued
that the tracking device violated his right to be free from unreasonable
searches under the Fourth Amendment.53 The North Carolina courts
rejected his argument relying on the theory that “the State’s system of
nonconsensual satellite-based monitoring d[id] not entail a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”54
In its decision to reverse the lower court, the Supreme Court cited
two of its prior cases that were inconsistent with this reasoning.55 In
United States v. Jones, the Court concluded that attaching a GPS
tracking device to a vehicle was a search because the government
physically entered a constitutionally protected space.56 In Florida v.
Jardines, the Court held that taking a drug-sniffing dog onto a person’s
porch was also a similar physical intrusion that fit well within the
definition of a Fourth Amendment “search.”57
Next, the Court reviewed the text of the North Carolina statute,
which required the monitoring to provide “[t]ime-correlated and
continuous tracking of the geographic location of the subject” and
“[r]eporting of subject’s violations of prescriptive and proscriptive
schedule or location requirements.”58 Based on this language and the
two prior cases, the Court declared that attaching “a device to a
person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that
individual’s movements” was in fact a “search.”59 The only question
left for the lower court to answer on remand was whether the search
itself was reasonable.60

52

Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1369 (2015).
Id.
54
Id. at 1370.
55
Id.
56
Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)).
57
Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417
(2013)).
58
Id. at 1371.
59
Id.
60
Id.
53
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When law enforcement obtains a judicial warrant before
conducting a search, it is generally considered reasonable.61 When law
enforcement operates without a warrant, courts review the
reasonableness of the search by examining the totality of the
circumstances.62 Specifically, the court will evaluate the level of
intrusion on the reasonable expectation of privacy of the person being
searched and the character and purpose of that search.63
The Supreme Court in Grady did not review whether this type of
statute may be applied retroactively to an offender who completed
serving his sentence.64 Some state courts have answered in the
negative.65 “According to these courts, the monitoring law’s adverse
effects are so punitive that they negate whatever civil intent was
envisioned by state legislature.”66
B. The Ex Post Facto Clause
The Constitution of the United States proscribes the enactment of
retroactive laws through the Ex Post Facto Clause.67 There are actually
two such clauses in the Constitution.68 One is in Article I Section 9,
which applies to the federal government, and another is in Article I
Section 10, which applies to the states.69 In Calder v. Bull, the
Supreme Court announced four circumstances when the clauses are
implicated:70

61

Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1105 (D. Wis. 2015).
Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 1370.
65
Lance J. Rogers, Lifetime GPS Monitoring Is Constitutional, CRIMINAL LAW
REPORTER (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.bna.com/lifetime-gps-ankle-n57982066905/.
66
Id.
67
Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)).
62
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1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and
punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime,
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in
order to convict the offender.71
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether a state may subject
a convicted sex offender to lifetime GPS tracking retroactively. The
Court did address the ex post facto implications of a civil commitment
statute in Kansas v. Hendricks, a law that is cited as most similar to the
satellite-based tracking program statutes.72 In 1994, Kansas enacted
the Sexually Violent Predator Act to mitigate the risk recidivist sex
offenders pose to public safety.73 In the same year, Leroy Hendricks,
who had an extensive history of sexually abusing minors, was about to
be released to a halfway house.74 The State asked the court’s
permission to place him under civil commitment.75 The trial court
granted the State’s request and held that pedophilia fit the definition of
“mental abnormality” described in the statute.76 In his appeal,
Hendricks attacked the statute on an ex post facto basis, among other
claims.77 The Court discussed the dangerousness of pedophilia and the
71

Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting Calder, 3 U.S. at 390).
See Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.2d 929, 937 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997)).
73
Id. at 351.
74
Id. 354-55.
75
Id. at 355.
76
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994) (“’Mental abnormality’ means a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting
such person a menace to the health and safety of others.”); id. at 355-56.
77
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
72
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statute’s narrow focus on well-defined offenders in detail.78 Because
the statute lacked punitive legislative intent, because it only applied to
a narrow class of dangerous offenders who were unable to control
their urges, because procedural safeguards required the periodic
judicial review of the appropriateness of ongoing confinement, and
because the statute required the offender to undergo treatment, the
Court declared that the civil commitment statute was not punitive.79
If GPS tracking is found comparable to civil commitment, the
Supreme Court may similarly label it “prevention” when it finally
decides an ex post facto challenge in a case involving this type of
monitoring. Some state courts disagree with this theory. In Riley v.
New Jersey State Parole Bd., the Supreme Court of New Jersey
reviewed the ex post facto implications of the State’s Sex Offender
Monitoring Act (“SOMA”) passed in 2007.80 George Riley was
“convicted of the second-degree attempted sexual assault of a minor”
in 1986.81 Because of his prior sexual assault convictions, he was
sentenced to twenty years.82 Six months after his release, the New
Jersey Parole Board advised Riley that, pursuant to SOMA, he would
have to wear an anklet monitor for the rest of his life.83 The Appellate
Division reversed the decision of the Parole Board and declared that
the statute violated federal and state ex post facto laws.84 The Parole
Board appealed arguing that Riley was subject to monitoring not
because of his past crimes but because of his “present
dangerousness.”85 The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected this
argument because Riley’s 1986 conviction was the reason behind this
designation.86 The court held that the monitoring program was no
78

Id. at 357-60.
Id. at 368-69.
80
Riley v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 219 N.J. 270, 275 (2014).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 274.
84
Id. at 278-79.
85
Id. at 281.
86
Id. at 291.
79
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different than parole, even though Riley was not under any court
ordered supervision.87 The court recognized that the legislature
intended to pass a nonpunitive statute, but it found the law to be
significantly punitive in effect, therefore, in violation of the “the Ex
Post Facto Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.”88
The Seventh Circuit decided to follow a different approach and
rejected both the Fourth Amendment and ex post facto violation
arguments in Belleau v. Wall.
II. BELLEAU V. WALL
In 1992, Michael Belleau was found guilty of sexually assaulting
an eight-year-old boy multiple times during a period of five years,
starting around 1987.89 Despite the severity of his crimes, his sentence
was only one year in jail and five years on probation.90 While on
probation in 1994, he was tried and convicted of the sexual assault of
another child, a nine-year old girl, which took place in 1988.91 This
time, his punishment was an additional ten years in prison.92
Nevertheless, he was paroled again after six years.93 By October 1,
2001, a year after his release, Belleau was back in prison.94 His parole
was revoked after he revealed his desire to molest two additional
children.95 Before he finished serving his latest sentence, the State of
Wisconsin petitioned to place him under civil commitment as “a
sexually violent person.”96 Belleau spent the next six years at the Sand

87

Id. at 294.
Id. at 297-98.
89
Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (E.D. Wis. 2015).
90
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).
91
Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1088.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 980.01(7) (1994)).
88
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Ridge Secure Treatment Center in Mauston, Wisconsin.97 In 2010, Dr.
Richard Ellwood, a psychologist at the facility, concluded that Belleau
no longer met the definition of “a sexually violent person” under the
civil commitment statute.98 As a result, he was going to be released
again.99
While Belleau was under civil commitment, the Wisconsin
legislature passed Wis. Stat. § 301.48, which requires the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to continue monitoring the
locations of persons who committed serious sexual offenses against
children following their release from involuntary civil commitment
under Chapter 980.100 Shortly after Belleau was released from the
Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, DOC agents detained him
“without any warrant or other court order” and secured a GPS device
on his right ankle.101 Belleau was “required to wear the GPS device 24
hours per day, seven days a week, for the rest of his life.”102 Although
the device is waterproof, it may cause skin irritation and has to be
charged about one hour every day.103 Moreover, technicians may need
to visit Belleau’s home periodically to replace the batteries in the
device.104 The anklet itself is fairly large, requiring the wearer to put
on long pants to hide it from plain sight.105
The law requires the DOC to create individualized inclusion
zones, which the offender is prohibited from leaving, and exclusion
zones, which he is prohibited from entering except to pass through, if
needed to protect the public.106 The DOC is not required to define such
zones for maximum discharge registrants, “those who have completed
97

Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1089.
99
Id. at 1090.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 932 (7th Cir. 2016).
106
WIS. STAT. § 301.48(3)(c) (2006).
98
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and been discharged from their sentences and/or commitments.”107
While Belleau was not subject to an exclusion zone at the time of his
trial, the statute left the creation of the zones in the hands of the
DOC.108 He was not monitored in real time, but a DOC employee
reviewed his whereabouts every night.109
Belleau appeared pro se in front of the United States District
Court Eastern District of Wisconsin to contest the constitutionality of
the statute.110 Recognizing the importance of Belleau’s challenge, the
court advised him to retain an attorney.111 “In view of the significance
of the issue Belleau has attempted to raise and his obvious lack of
legal training and difficulty in even naming and serving the proper
party, it would appear that this might be an appropriate case for the
court to consider recruitment of counsel to represent him.”112
Following the court’s advice, Belleau retained attorneys who
submitted an amended complaint on his behalf claiming that the GPS
monitoring statute violated the Ex Post Facto clauses, the Fourth
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.113
A. The District Court Agreed With the Defendant
The district court did not question the need for the GPS
monitoring statute. “Given his prior convictions, Dr. Ellwood’s
diagnosis of pedophilia, and the impact of sexually assaultive crimes
on children, few would not want to take any step that could reduce the
risk of another offense.”114 However, the court disagreed with the
107

Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Belleau v. Greene, No. 12-C-1198, 2013 WL 1975672 at *1 (E.D. Wis.
2013).
111
Id. at *5.
112
Id.
113
Amended Complaint at ¶¶1-4, Belleau v. Wall, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (E.D.
Wis. 2015) (No. 12-cv-1198).
114
Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1092.
108
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application of the statute to an individual who was no longer under any
supervision, probation, or parole.115 The court stated:
Having served his sentences for his crimes and been
discharged from his civil commitment, Belleau’s liberty has
thus been restored, subject to the limited disqualifications,
such as the right to possess a firearm, that the law expressly
allows. He is, moreover, legally presumed to be free, like the
rest of us, to cho[o]se whether or not to engage in criminal
conduct.116
The question the court focused on was “whether such a person
who has already served his sentence for his crimes and is no longer
under any form of court ordered supervision can be forced by the State
to wear such a device and to pay the State for the cost of monitoring
him for the rest of his life” when it granted Belleau’s motion for
summary judgment “on his ex post facto and Fourth Amendment
claims.”117 Judge Griesbach found it unnecessary to address Belleau’s
equal protection violation claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.118
1.

The District Court Found That the Statute Violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause of the Constitution

The district court first examined whether applying the statute to
Belleau was an ex post facto violation.119 Judge Griesbach answered
the question in the affirmative.120 He rejected the State’s argument that
115

Id.
Id.
117
Id. at 1092-93, 1110.
118
Id. at 1092-93, 1111 n.6 (“Although Belleau also argues that the State's
lifetime GPS tracking law violates his right to equal protection of the law under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is not necessary to address that issue, especially since the
answer likely rises or falls with my analysis of his claims that the law violates his
rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourth Amendment.”)
119
Id. at 1093-1104.
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Id.
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the statute was not retroactive because it was triggered by Belleau’s
release from civil commitment in 2010, not by the crime he committed
twenty years prior.121 “[E]ven if it was the discharge from his civil
commitment that made him subject to lifetime GPS monitoring, it was
his previous criminal convictions that made him eligible for civil
commitment in the first place.”122 There was no “subsequent
misconduct” that would suggest otherwise.123
After concluding that the statute applied to Belleau retroactively,
the court turned its focus to whether the statute itself was a
punishment.124 While Judge Griesbach could not ascertain the
legislative intent behind the statute regarding punishment, he did
highlight that the execution of the statute itself was in the hands of the
DOC, whose purpose was to “provide ‘correction’ to people who
engage[d] in criminal conduct.”125 The statute itself can be found in a
section that “governs corrections,” but that fact by itself is not
dispositive because Wisconsin’s sex offender registry is located under
the same section, and it has been declared “not to be punitive.”126
Historically, the court observed, the supervision of persons was
“regarded as a traditional form of punishment.”127 Moreover, if
Belleau failed to charge the device or tampered with it, he would face
a hefty fine or imprisonment.128 Judge Griesbach noted that the public
shaming that accompanied the wearing of an ankle monitor further
tipped the scale toward punishment.129 Belleau would not be able to
wear shorts or change in a public dressing room if he did not want his

121

Id. at 1094.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1095.
125
Id. at 1096.
126
Id. (citing Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F. Supp. 2d 897, 906 (D. Wis. 2012), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part by Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014)).
127
Id. at 1098.
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Id.
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device discovered.130 Additionally, the required payment of $50 per
month “ha[d] the effect of a fine, another traditional form of
punishment imposed by the State on criminal defendants.”131
The court also considered the time Belleau was obligated to spend
dealing with the device. He was required to plug it into an outlet one
hour each day.132 While there are many devices today that take about
an hour a day to be fully charged, most do not require a person to
remain near the outlet during that time.133 According to the court, this
added up to 75 days over five years, not including the time Belleau
had to spend waiting to let technicians into his home.134 Admittedly,
the goal of the statute is to protect the public because “a person subject
to GPS supervision is believed to be less likely to re-offend since he
knows he will be caught.”135 However, that “is simply deterrence by
another name,” and deterrence can be a form of punishment.136
Judge Griesbach concluded that the Wisconsin law violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the Constitution because “the effects of the law
[were] so punitive that they negate[d] the legislature’s non-punitive
intent.”137 He then turned his attention to Belleau’s Fourth Amendment
violation claim.138
2.

The District Court Found That the Statute Violated the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution

Relying on Grady v. North Carolina, the district court concluded
that GPS monitoring of a person implicated the Fourth Amendment.139
130

Id.
Id. at 1100.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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Id. at 1102.
136
Id.
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Id. at 1104.
138
Id.
139
Id. (citing Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015)).
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However, because “the Fourth Amendment prohibits only
unreasonable searches,” not all searches fall into this category.140
Reasonableness “depends on the totality of the circumstances,
including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which
the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.”141 If the
primary purpose of a search is to gather evidence, law enforcement is
generally under an obligation to obtain a warrant.142 The existence of
probable cause that a crime has been committed is necessary to
convince a judge to sign a warrant.143 Accordingly, attaching a GPS
monitoring device to a vehicle without a warrant was found to be
unlawful in United States v. Jones.144 In Belleau’s case, the court found
no probable cause.145
Precedent leads to the conclusion that a search may be considered
reasonable without a warrant in some cases but still “requires a
balancing of the individual privacy interests at stake against the needs
of the public.”146 In Samson v. California, for example, “the Court
upheld a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee” while
acknowledging the “high levels of recidivism in California and the
State's strong interest in reducing that rate and promoting reintegration
of people released from prison into the community.”147 However, in
Samson, the offender consented to the search as a condition of his
parole.148 While holding that the GPS monitoring program in Belleau’s
case violated the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that his
expectation of privacy was higher than the parolee in Samson because
140

Id. (quoting Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371).
Id.
142
Id. (citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)).
143
Id. at 1105 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989)).
144
Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1105 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 948-49 (2012)).
145
Belleau, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1105.
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Id. at 1105-06 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)).
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Belleau fully served his sentence.149 At the same time, the court
acknowledged the unquestionable “importance of protecting children
from sexual assault or the devastating effects of such crimes,” which is
why states could include lifetime GPS monitoring in punishments for
serious crimes.150
B. The Seventh Circuit Reversed the District Court
The State appealed the lower court’s decision to grant Belleau’s
motion for summary judgment.151 Judge Posner, who delivered the
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
focused heavily on the nature of Belleau’s crimes when he reversed
the district court’s holding.152 The court also noted that pedophilia was
not curable and predisposed offenders to molest children.153 The court
quoted the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center psychologist who
“concluded that Mr. Belleau had not shown that he could suppress or
manage his deviant desire.”154 Although Belleau’s age may have
reduced the probability that he would commit another crime against a
child, the court noted that these types of offenses are especially
heinous due to the deep psychological scars that follow and the
shocking level of underreporting.155 Though Belleau’s supervision
ended, he had not become harmless.156 “[W]e doubt that the
community would or should be reassured by a psychologist’s guess
that a pedophile has ‘only’ (say) a 49 percent chance of reoffending, or
even the 16 percent chance estimated in this case.”157
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With these factors in mind, the court announced that “persons
who have demonstrated a compulsion to commit very serious crimes
and have been civilly determined to have a more likely than not
chance of reoffending must expect to have a diminished right of
privacy as a result of the risk of their recidivating."158 The Seventh
Circuit went on to compare Belleau’s current state of privacy under the
existing sex offender registry law to the added loss of his privacy
under the GPS monitoring statute and concluded that this additional
loss was merely incremental: “it just identifies locations.”159
1.

The Seventh Circuit Found no Fourth Amendment Violation

The court cited Grady as an indication that GPS monitoring of sex
offenders was valid under the Fourth Amendment as long as the search
itself was reasonable.160 Although continuously keeping track of
Belleau’s locations can generate evidence if he does decide to commit
another heinous crime against a child, the primary goal of the
monitoring statute is to deter him from doing so.161 Even his own
attorney admitted that lifetime monitoring of a child sex offender
would not offend the Fourth Amendment if it was part of the
punishment or a condition of parole.162
The court was not particularly convinced that the GPS monitor
was a burden on Belleau, but even if it was, it had to “be balanced
against the gain to society from requiring that the anklet monitor be
worn.”163 At least one study in California pointed to the likelihood that
parolees wearing such devices were less likely to be re-arrested for a
new sex offense.164 Society benefits if law enforcement can easily
identify the locations of sex offenders when a victim reports a sexual
158

Id. at 935.
Id. at 936.
160
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assault.165 Judge Posner noted that even sex offenders would benefit
from this statute.166 They are provided with a rock solid alibi if they
were nowhere near the crime scene.167 More broadly, the court noted
that the balance of Belleau’s rights against the goal of protecting
children weighed in favor of protection. “Given how slight is the
incremental loss of privacy from having to wear the anklet monitor,
and how valuable to society (including sex offenders who have gone
straight) the information collected by the monitor is, we can't agree
with the district judge that the Wisconsin law violates the Fourth
Amendment.”168
Belleau argued that the monitoring required a search warrant,
which was not necessary under the statute.169 The court disagreed,
calling the idea “absurd.”170 Police officers use surveillance techniques
to keep an eye on a neighborhood where illegal drug dealing is
suspected.171 They use hidden cameras to record drivers who run a red
light.172 No warrant is required in either case because these techniques
are considered “investigative surveillance.”173 Furthermore, because
DOC agents could follow Belleau after he left his house, there is no
reason why they couldn’t utilize a GPS tracking device to achieve the
same result.174 With that said, the court concluded that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation because Belleau’s monitoring was
reasonable under the circumstances.175
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The Seventh Circuit Found no Ex Post Facto Violation

Next, the Seventh Circuit turned its attention to Belleau’s claim
that the GPS monitoring statute was an ex post facto law.176 While the
statute did take effect after Belleau had committed his crimes, the ex
post facto rule only applies to statutes that impose punishments.177 The
court briefly discussed Kansas v. Hendricks, a case in which the
Supreme Court held that civil commitments of sex offenders were
considered prevention, not punishment.178 Drawing on this case, Judge
Posner declared that if civil commitment was not punishment, neither
was GPS monitoring.179 They both had the same goal: to prevent
violent sex offenders from hurting children.180 The court continued
with comparing the anklet monitor to posted speed limits.181 The same
way speed limit signs inform a driver that he will face a fine if he
doesn’t obey them, the GPS monitor informs the pedophile that he
could be punished if he commits another crime.182 Because the court
found that the lifetime tracking served a preventive purpose and was
not intended as a punishment, they also concluded that the law did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.183
3.

The Concurring Opinion Offered Slightly Different Justifications

Judge Flaum concurred in judgment and authored a separate
opinion.184 He focused on the need for balancing a person’s right to
privacy against the state’s compelling interest in protecting children
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from sexual abuse.185 “These sexual predators victimize children, who
may suffer from trauma from the assault for the rest of their lives.”186
Because Belleau was no longer under any supervision, Judge Flaum
turned to the special needs doctrine to find justification for the GPS
monitoring statute.187 The doctrine applies to “suspicionless searches”
that serve special needs and do not exist merely for gathering
evidence.188 Because the primary goal of the tracking program was to
reduce recidivism, it qualified as a special needs search.189 Judge
Flaum acknowledged the tremendously important privacy interest at
stake in this case, especially because Belleau fully served his sentence
and was not a parolee.190 At the same time, Belleau’s expectation of
privacy was not the same as an ordinary citizen’s due to “mandatory
registration laws and civil commitment.”191 In this program, requiring
a warrant just did not make sense because warrants are usually issued
when there is a suspicion that a crime has been committed.192 Here, the
goal was to prevent the crime from ever taking place.193 Therefore, the
monitoring was “a reasonable special needs search,” and the Fourth
Amendment was not violated.194
Next, Judge Flaum turned his attention to the ex post facto
claim.195 “Unquestionably, this law applies retroactively to
Belleau.”196 From the language of the statute, Judge Flaum found it
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clear that the primary goal of the legislature was prevention.197 “The
language of the monitoring statute indicates that the legislature’s
objective was to protect children, not punish sex offenders.”198 He also
considered whether, in spite of the lack of punitive intent, the law had
a punitive effect.199 He relied on five of the seven “Mendoza-Martinez
factors” the Supreme Court promulgated in Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez to guide his review.200
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the
inquiry, and may often point in differing directions.201
GPS technology is “distinguishable from traditional forms of
punishment” because it is “relatively new.”202 It is not like probation
or parole because those “impose restrictions.” In this case, there were
not any restrictions on where Belleau was able to go.203 Although
Belleau complained of “public shaming” because the device
occasionally became visible to others, it was not the objective of the
statute.204 The minor inconvenience was not significant enough to be
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called punitive.205 “[A]s GPS devices become smaller and batteries
last longer, any affirmative restraint imposed by this law will, over
time, become less and less burdensome.”206 The statute is similar to
sex offender registries where the goal is not punishment but
deterrence.207 Similarly, the primary goal is to protect children from
such offenders, not to punish them.208
Lastly, Judge Flaum found that the law was not excessive because
pedophilia was simply not treatable.209 “Coupled with the particularly
devastating consequences of their conduct, these offenders pose a
unique—and perhaps insurmountable—challenge for conventional law
enforcement techniques.”210 In the end, Judge Flaum came to the same
conclusion as the majority: the GPS monitoring statute was not an ex
post facto law.211
III. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?
A. States May Utilize GPS Technology to Monitor Sex Offenders for
the Rest of Their Lives
After Belleau v. Wall, States in the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction
may freely monitor sex offenders for life, even if they fully served
their sentences and are not under any form of supervision.212
Considering that no warrant or court order is needed, the ruling
appears to be in slight conflict with the district court judge’s statement
that “[t]he State’s authority over the individual is not unlimited.”213
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The Supreme Court of the United States offered limited guidance
on the issue. In Samson, the Court held that the suspicionless search of
a parolee did not offend the Fourth Amendment, and because Donald
Curtis Samson, the defendant in the case, was on parole “following a
conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm,” his
expectation of privacy was drastically diminished.214 Although Belleau
was not a parolee, because of the seriousness of his crimes and
because there was a significant possibility that he would repeat them,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that his right to privacy was similarly
reduced.215 In Grady v. North Carolina, Torrey Dale Grady, a
convicted sex offender, argued that “his Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures” was violated when he
was ordered to wear a GPS anklet monitor for the rest of his life.216
The Supreme Court declared that such tracking did constitute a search
implicating the Fourth Amendment, but it was only unconstitutional if
it was unreasonable.217 Several states now allow or even require
lifetime monitoring of sex offenders.218
Ultimately, Grady and Samson suggest that the Supreme Court
will find lifetime tracking programs constitutional, especially when
considering the high rates of recidivism among sex offenders and the
ongoing need to protect children from them.219 For now, the Court has
left open the question whether lifetime GPS monitoring is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.220 Until and unless the Supreme Court
or Congress says otherwise, tracking sex offenders for the remainder
of their lives is permitted, even after they fully serve their sentences
and complete their probations.
214
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B. The Supreme Court Needs to Review Whether States are Permitted
to Apply GPS Monitoring Laws Retroactively
The Seventh Circuit conceded that the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution was implicated because the Wisconsin statute became
effective long after Belleau had committed his crimes.221 To escape
this limitation, the court relied on Kansas v. Hendricks, a case in
which the Supreme Court concluded that the civil commitment of a
violent sex offender was a preventive measure, not a punishment.222
After Judge Posner declared that civil commitments and GPS
monitoring were alike, the Ex Post Facto Clause was no longer an
obstacle to the validity of the Wisconsin statute.223
Other circuits have come to a different conclusion. In Riley,
George C. Riley, a convicted sex offender, claimed that New Jersey’s
Sex Offender Monitoring Act, a law that was passed two decades after
his last offense, was additional punishment because it was no different
than a form of supervision for life.224 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey agreed with the defendant and concluded that the statute
violated “both the federal and state constitutional guarantees against
ex post facto laws.”225 In Commonwealth v. Cory, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts came to the same conclusion that GPS
monitoring was punishment and could not be applied to a sex offender
retroactively.226
Several factors suggest that GPS monitoring is different from civil
commitment. Tracking devices merely monitor an offender’s location
and do not provide treatment similar to the ones available in civil
commitment settings. Belleau, for example, spent time with a
psychologist at the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center.227
221
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Additionally, the Wisconsin monitoring program, unlike the statute in
Hendricks, does not provide for periodic judicial review.228 The main
objective of the ankle monitor was to deter Belleau from repeating his
crimes.229 The Hendricks Court, however, differentiated civil
commitments from deterrence because pedophiles were “unlikely to be
deterred by the threat of confinement.”230 Lastly, unlike the lifetime
length of the GPS monitoring statute, an offender under civil
commitment is not to “remain confined any longer than he suffers
from a mental abnormality rendering him unable to control his
dangerousness.”231
The Supreme Court should weigh in on the disagreement among
the lower courts and proclaim whether the retroactive application of
GPS monitoring programs to sex offenders is an additional
punishment or simply a preventive measure. In their current state,
these programs look more like punishment and less like prevention
because they penalize the offender for noncompliance.232 Even if the
offender just forgets to charge the device, he may be in violation of the
statute that could punish him with imprisonment or a hefty fine.233
Today, better technology is available to keep batteries charged longer
than a single day.234 There is no reason, other than perhaps cost, why
the states could not design a more maintenance-free version of the
ankle monitor. Additionally, if legislatures removed the threat of
punishment from these programs, they would start looking more like
preventive measures or even treatments. At a minimum, legislatures
should consider incorporating mandatory satellite-based lifetime
228
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monitoring of repeat sex offenders in their sentencing guidelines to
avoid ex post facto challenges all together.
CONCLUSION
Due to the heinous nature of sexual assault, particularly the
impact on children, there is tremendous pressure on courts to keep sex
offenders under lifetime surveillance or supervision. Because of this
pressure, courts struggle to find the right balance between the rights of
felons to be free from unreasonable searches and retroactive
application of laws against the rights of the public, including children,
to be free from sexual violence.
Surveillance is fairly common today, and many of the methods do
not raise serious constitutional questions. Red light cameras, for
example, are acceptable because they are installed on traffic signals
and monitor public roads. Perhaps monitoring by using drone
technology could also fall into the permitted category. However, the
moment monitoring devices are attached to individuals or their
vehicles, the government is crossing into a world protected by the
Constitution. These lifetime GPS tracking programs are powerful tools
that allow offenders to re-enter society and deter them from repeating
their crimes, but states should proceed with caution and design their
programs without violating the Constitution’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures and ex post facto application of
laws.

163
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

29

